[ P(t, u) = 2^{-t/T} \cdot (1 - e^{-\lambda u}) ]
Key Half-Life 1.1 forces a hard question: How much trust can you put in a secret that is slowly bleeding? The answer is uncomfortable. You stop treating keys as eternal truths and start treating them as short-lived credentials. You implement automatic rotation not as a quarterly chore, but as a continuous background process. You build systems where a key compromised after its half-life is irrelevant—because it has already been replaced. key half life 1.1
Version 1.0 of key half-life was simple. It said: After time T, a cryptographic key has a 50% chance of being compromised. That was the era of Moore’s Law as a gentle slope, where attack surfaces were smaller and trust was implicit. But threats don't stand still. [ P(t, u) = 2^{-t/T} \cdot (1 -
This is the quiet revolution of 1.1: moving from static security to kinetic security . The half-life is not a warning. It is a design parameter. You implement automatic rotation not as a quarterly