Booru.allthefallen.more «HIGH-QUALITY – BLUEPRINT»

[+] Token extracted: boru_block_survive [+] Flag: flagb0oru_4ll_th3_f4ll3n_m0r3 | Technique | Why it mattered | |-----------|-----------------| | Directory brute‑forcing (ffuf/DirBuster) | Discovered the hidden /more endpoint. | | EXIF inspection ( exiftool ) | Revealed the token hidden in normal image metadata. | | Base64 decoding | Turned the encoded token into a usable string. | | Parameter/ cookie token authentication | Showed that the service used a simple secret‑in‑URL scheme. | | Steganography awareness | Though the flag was not hidden in pixel data, checking with zsteg is a good habit for “booru”‑style challenges. |

curl -s -o hidden_flag.jpg "https://booru.allthefallen.more/static/img/hidden_flag.jpg" At first glance it was a plain JPEG with a resolution of 1×1 pixel – just a black dot. Running exiftool again gave:

curl -s "https://booru.allthefallen.more/more?token=boru_block_survive" The server responded with a 200 OK and an HTML page that listed a single hidden image: booru.allthefallen.more

UserComment : token=Ym9ydV9ibG9ja19zdXJ2aXZl The value is Base64‑encoded. Decoding it gives:

The goal was to retrieve the flag, which was hidden somewhere in the service’s assets or responses. 2.1 Browsing the site The homepage ( / ) returned a simple HTML page that loaded JavaScript from /static/app.js and a handful of images from /static/img/ . The page source revealed a hidden comment: | | Parameter/ cookie token authentication | Showed

https://booru.allthefallen.more/ The landing page displayed a list of thumbnails and a search box. No obvious “flag” was visible, but the title “more” hinted that there was “something more” hidden behind the interface.

Write‑up by YourName – 2023

<!-- see /more for the rest --> Running a quick DirBuster/ffuf scan against the root with a small wordlist ( common.txt ) uncovered a hidden endpoint: